

CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE TRAFFIC STOP DATA AUDIT SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

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FORWARD

This report represents the final phase of a multi-step effort by the Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project (CTRP3) staff, directed by the Advisory Board, to assess potential issues in Connecticut State Police (CSP) traffic stop records. Concerns arose in 2022 after media reports revealed that a 2018 internal investigation had uncovered four state troopers who submitted false traffic stop records to CSP's internal system. Since the same system supplied data to the state's racial profiling database, the Advisory Board authorized a comprehensive audit of CSP records from 2014 to 2021. The audit, published in June 2023, found that data inaccuracies likely involved more troopers and additional years.

Following the audit, CSP reviewed systemic issues contributing to these inaccuracies and examined records submitted by troopers and constables identified in the audit. The review aimed to determine which records represented actual traffic stops but were submitted in a form that failed to meet reliability standards. CSP also identified some troopers and constables whose records could not be reconciled. Throughout the process, CSP shared findings with the project staff.

This supplemental report, which completes the final phase of our audit, addresses many of the systemic issues identified and clarifies the reliability of the audited records. We submit this report to the Advisory Board, confident that we now have a clearer understanding of the inaccuracies that led to unreliable data being reported to the racial profiling database. In collaboration with the CSP, we have worked to resolve these issues and ensure they do not recur.

We are confident that most systemic issues have been addressed, significantly reducing the chances of similar problems in the future. Additionally, we have determined which records from the audit are reliable, which likely represent actual traffic stops but should be interpreted with caution, and which remain too unreliable. We recommend the Advisory Board consider how to manage the unreliable records in the historical database.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This supplemental report builds on the June 2023 audit of Connecticut State Police (CSP) traffic stop data by providing a more detailed review of record discrepancies from 2014 to 2021. The initial audit identified over 25,000 unsubstantiated infraction records submitted to the state's racial profiling database, raising concerns about the complete accuracy of the overall database. Of particular concern were 130 troopers with a statistically significant number of unmatched records in at least one year of the audit—the reconciliation process aimed to investigate these discrepancies further. While the initial audit did not determine whether the inaccurate records resulted from intentional falsification, carelessness, or human and technical errors, additional inquiries, including an independent investigation by Finn Dixon & Herling LLP, sought to evaluate possible motives. However, it was beyond the scope of this supplemental report to assess individual intentions. Instead, we focused on understanding the technical and human errors that contributed to the inaccuracies.

The reconciliation process focused on reviewing overreported records, which are defined as discrepancies where more citations were reported in the racial profiling database than in the Centralized Infraction Bureau (CIB) database. The process reviewed over 30,000 records submitted by 130 troopers with the most significant discrepancies in the original audit. The early identification of badge number errors accounted for 11% of the discrepancies, resulting in 26 troopers being removed from further consideration, and their data is now considered reliable.

Out of the 104 remaining troopers, 67 were fully reconciled, meaning it was determined that a traffic stop occurred, but some error or errors in the record caused it not to be matched. Seven troopers were only partially reconciled, meaning some unmatched records remained. However, 30 troopers, including eight of the top ten flagged in the audit, could not be reconciled. The reconciliation process largely confirmed the original audit's findings for these unreconciled troopers. As a result of the reconciliation process, the records submitted by 38 troopers (30 unreconciled and seven partially reconciled) were deemed unreliable. Additionally, one trooper who was reconciled for a single year was found to have significant discrepancies in other years, further confirming the unreliability of their records.

The reconciliation process revealed several issues that explained 70 percent of the errors found in the unmatched records for the 74 troopers fully or partially reconciled. These errors included age discrepancies (30% of errors), badge number errors (32% of errors), stop date errors (4% of records), town tickets (18% of errors), and other minor errors.

As this report also highlights, CSP has made significant progress in addressing the most critical concerns outlined in the June 2023 audit. CSP has implemented several corrective actions, including improving training, updating reporting systems, and enhancing oversight of stop records. They have made significant progress in improving the accuracy of the data reported. We are confident that the changes made and CSP's oversight mechanisms have addressed most of the correctable problems, and we do not anticipate similar errors in the data going forward. All of these efforts will help improve the public's trust in the data reporting system.

¹ Some records that were matched in the reconciliation process were identified with more than one error.

BACKGROUND

In August 2022, Hearst Connecticut Media reported that four state police troopers were investigated by their department in 2018 for creating fictitious citations in the department's computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system.² These allegations concerned the Connecticut Racial Profiling Prohibition Project (CTRP3) advisory board because it appeared possible that these fictitious records were causing inaccurate data to be reported to Connecticut's racial profiling data collection system. The advisory board wanted to determine the extent to which any racial profiling records submitted by these troopers or possibly others may have introduced unreliability in the data used to analyze the state police generally and individual troop barracks.

The advisory board was further concerned that the Connecticut State Police never notified it of the potentially fictitious data records being submitted to the racial profiling database.³ A timely notification could have helped researchers ensure that due diligence was done regarding the quality of data being analyzed and reported. The advisory board, therefore, initiated an inquiry that ultimately led to a comprehensive audit of the state police data.

The audit was released in June 2023 and included a review of all stops reported to have resulted in an infraction between January 1, 2014, and December 31, 2021. The audit identified unsubstantiated infraction records submitted to the racial profiling database by troopers and constables during the eight years that were audited. Based on the analysis, researchers concluded that inaccurate records were submitted to the racial profiling system. Researchers also concluded that the number of unreliable records introduced into the system had a small but statistically significant impact on studies published during those calendar years.⁴

The audit suggested a historical pattern and practice among some troopers and constables of submitting inaccurate infraction records to the racial profiling system. The issue was most prominent in Troop F in the Central District and throughout all the troops in the Eastern District. There were 311 troopers and 76 constables with a statistically significant number of unsubstantiated records in at least one year of the audit. When using more restrictive identification criteria, including the number of unmatched records and the percentage of unmatched records, 130 troopers and 63 constables were identified in at least one year of the audit.

As researchers, we determined that inaccurate records were submitted to the system. We could not determine the intention or motivation for submitting these records, nor were we attempting to do so

². CSP internal affairs initially investigated four troopers. According to the conclusions written by CSP investigators in each of the reports, each trooper created "fictitious" motor vehicle stops in the department's CAD system. It was determined that no citation was, in fact, issued.

³ In October 2018, CSP initiated an agency-generated complaint (M-18-210) that specifically identified inaccurate and fictitious racial profiling data being submitted to the state through the CAD system.

⁴ The audit found that the unmatched records were 9.65 percentage points (14.12%, p<0.001) more likely to be reported as White while -4.44 percentage points (-33.9%, p<0.001) less likely to be Black, and -4.59 percentage points (-31.36%, p<0.001) less likely to be Hispanic. 68.3% of the raw unadjusted racial profiling infractions involved White motorists. Excluding unmatched records, we found a statistically significant decline of 0.32pp, dropping White motorists' share to 67.98%. Black motorists increased from 14.54% to 14.69%, and Hispanic motorists increased from 13.14% to 13.29% when the unmatched records were removed from the raw data.

in our audit. For our purposes, whether records were intentionally falsified, resulted from carelessness, or human error was not part of the scope of the audit.

Following the audit's release, the Connecticut General Assembly's Judiciary and Public Safety Committees held an informational hearing on July 26, 2023. The CTRP3 research staff were invited to present their findings, and CSP Command Staff and union representatives were also invited to provide additional information and comments. During this hearing, CSP command staff informed legislators that it would be working on reviewing and reconciling troopers or constables identified with significant discrepancies. Any information learned from this reconciliation process would be shared with the audit's authors and eventually provided to the public.

In August 2023, the Connecticut State Police's Office of Administrative Services began a thorough review of all infraction records and shared their findings with CTRP3. Additionally, Governor Lamont appointed the law firm Finn Dixon & Herling LLP to conduct an independent investigation into whether individual troopers intentionally falsified records or whether the discrepancies were due to carelessness, human error, or other factors. Their report, released on January 31, 2024, and found here, focused on these issues. This supplemental report highlights the key findings from the reconciliation process. By sharing this information with the public, we aim to complete the review of these records and help guide future improvements.

I. RECONCILIATION PROCESS

The June 2023 audit report identified two criteria for identifying troopers with unsubstantiated records in at least one year of the audit. The first criteria identified troopers that exceeded more than two standard deviations from the mean in the number of unsubstantiated records submitted. Under this criterion, we identified 311 troopers and 76 constables with a statistically significant number of unsubstantiated records in at least one year of the audit. We then applied a more restrictive identification criteria that included the number of unmatched records and the percentage of unmatched records. Using these criteria, 130 troopers and 63 constables were identified in at least one year of the audit.

Given the size and scope of a more detailed review, the State Police and CTRP3 project staff jointly agreed to focus primarily on the troopers and constables identified under the more restrictive criteria. In addition, this review solely focused on the records identified as overreported in the audit. An overreported record was identified when there was a discrepancy between the racial profiling database and the Centralized Infraction Bureau (CIB) database, in which more records were reported to the racial profiling database. In other words, the racial profiling database indicated that a stop was conducted and a citation was issued, but we could not find a match in the CIB database. The audit also identified underreported records, a discrepancy where there were more records in the CIB database after accounting for infractions issued during a crash investigation and for non-traffic-related violations compared to the racial profiling system. The methodology used to identify underreported records made conducting a comprehensive review of these records more challenging.

The CTRP3 project staff and CSP agreed that the reconciliation process should primarily concentrate on overreported records. This decision was influenced by several factors, including limited resources and the fact that overreported records were included in the annual racial profiling study. While the audit also pointed out underreported records that should have been submitted to the racial profiling database, these records were never included in the annual analysis. Since underreported records were not part of the racial profiling database, they were not prioritized during the reconciliation process. However, by identifying these underreported records, we were able to correct many of the reasons that led to their omission. Consequently, the focus of the reconciliation process remained on the overreported records rather than the underreported ones.

The reconciliation process aimed to determine whether additional factors caused data not to be matched in the original audit. CSP established a team of sworn and civilian personnel to review detailed records from the internal records management system for each trooper and constable identified. CSP primarily focused on years when a trooper or constable met the identification criteria. For example, a trooper may have had overreported records in six of the eight years, but only one year met the identification criteria. In this example, the reconciliation process primarily focused on the trooper's activity during the one year that met the identification criteria. In some instances, CSP expanded their review of a trooper based on information learned during the reconciliation process. A record-by-record review can be highly time-consuming. Therefore, many of the decisions about

⁵ The CTRP3 is staffed by the Institute for Municipal and Regional Policy at the University of Connecticut.

which records to focus on were made to balance time, resources, and the efficient conclusion of our audit.

The records reconciliation began with CSP isolating the trooper/constable's stop records within its internal records management system for the year in question. The audit team provided the case numbers for all the unmatched cases identified in the audit. CSP reviewed more than 30,000 records, both matched and unmatched, to determine if there were any errors or additional explanations for the initial determination that the record could not be matched. Detailed records from the internal records management system and a summary were provided to researchers at the IMRP for review and comment. IMRP researchers also reviewed the data provided by CSP and provided additional comments that were then returned to CSP for their review and consideration. Between August 2023 and March 2024, CSP provided the IMRP with 14 batches of data. Each reconciled batch typically included a review of five to seven troopers. The following section outlines our general findings.

II. SUMMARY OF RECONCILIATION FINDINGS

The audit reviewed records submitted by 1,300 troopers over eight years, from 2014 to 2021. The reconciliation process focused on more than 30,000 records from 130 troopers who met the stricter identification criteria (about 10% of all troopers audited). These 130 troopers were responsible for 12,920 unmatched records, while the remaining 13,046 records came from a sample of 1,170 other troopers.

Early in the review, CSP found that 26 of the 130 troopers had incorrect badge numbers in the database, often due to promotions or reassigning badge numbers.⁶ This led to the wrong trooper receiving credit for stop activity. Once this error was corrected, these 26 troopers no longer met the identification criteria and were removed from further consideration.⁷ They accounted for 2,895 of the 25,966 overreported records (about 11%)⁸. After excluding these 26 troopers, the total number of overreported records was reduced to 23,071. In this section, "overreported records" refers to these 23,071 remaining unmatched records after correcting for the badge number errors.

The CTRP3 project staff has no information on the current status of any trooper or constable reviewed (active, retired, or employed in another agency). CSP committed to reviewing the records from the identified troopers, regardless of their current employment status. State law and departmental policies and procedures may limit CSP's ability to conduct further inquiries. The purpose of this review was to determine if the records could be reconciled to fall below the identification criteria for each year a trooper was flagged. After excluding the 26 troopers with a badge issue, 104 remained for reconciliation. These 104 troopers were responsible for a significant portion of the overreported records, accounting for 43 percent of the total overreported records.

Of the 104 troopers reviewed, CSP reconciled 67 below the identification criteria. CSP could only partially reconcile seven troopers, and 30 could not be reconciled. When we refer to reconciled trooper records, we refer to 74 fully or partially reconciled troopers. The reconciliation process primarily focused on records for the years that exceeded the identification criteria. All records submitted during those years were reviewed in this process regardless of whether they were previously matched. A trooper was considered fully reconciled if a reasonable explanation could be provided for enough records that the trooper fell below the initial identification criteria for all the years the trooper was identified. A trooper was considered partially reconciled if a reasonable explanation could be provided for enough records that the trooper fell below the initial identification criteria for only some of the years the trooper was identified. Figure 2.1 shows the number of troopers reviewed and the outcome of the reconciliation process.

⁶ CSP modified its protocol for reassigning badge numbers to ensure this error would not occur.

⁷ The data submitted by these 26 troopers is considered reliable and can be used in the existing racial profiling database.

 $^{^8}$ 804,063 infraction records were reviewed in the original audit. 778,097, or 96.7%, were matched, and 25,966, or 3.3%, were not matched.

⁹ One of the 67 troopers reconciled was identified for additional review by CSP. Although 2014-20 did not meet the identification criteria, the large number of overreported records raised concerns that warranted additional review.

¹⁰ In a limited number of cases, CSP identified additional unsubstantiated, inaccurate, or overreported records.




Figure 2. 1: Status of Troopers Reviewed During Reconciliation Process

CSP reviewed almost 15,000 infraction records from the 74 fully or partially reconciled troopers and more than 12,000 infraction records from the 30 not reconciled. For the 74 troopers fully or partially reconciled, CSP matched an additional 2,950 records. They matched an additional 594 records for the 30 troopers that remain unreconciled. Figure 2.2 shows the number of records matched and not matched during the reconciliation review. The blue bar represents the records matched in the original audit. The orange bar represents the records matched as part of the reconciliation process. The gray bar represents the records that could not be matched for the 104 troopers after the reconciliation review.




Figure 2. 2: Status of Reconciled Records Reviewed

¹¹ CSP reviewed all infraction records submitted to the racial profiling database regardless of whether they were matched in the original audit.

The original audit identified 5,804 overreported records for the 74 fully or partially reconciled troopers, representing 25 percent of all overreported records. Of the 5,804 overreported records, only 4,148 fell within years that met the identification criteria for additional review. CSP could not substantiate at least 1,198 of the records reviewed. The original audit also attempted to credit troopers for records with multiple errors. A single-stop record could have more than seven errors, but researchers found a tenuous match. Of the 74 troopers reconciled, 49 had records with multiple errors matched in the audit. In addition to the 5,804 overreported records identified for these 74 troopers, we determined that at least 2,147 additional records had errors. These errors also made it challenging to analyze annual traffic stop data accurately.

Four errors explain 95 percent of the discrepancies found in the reconciled records. Five smaller errors explain some additional unmatched records as well. Figure 2.3 shows the number of errors by category for the reconciled troopers.




Figure 2. 3: Reason for Reconciliation of Unmatched Records

Below is a more detailed explanation of the errors that led to unmatched records in the initial audit and what was learned during the reconciliation process. Although CSP reviewed almost 15,000 records submitted by these 74 troopers, this summary focuses on the results of the 4,148 records overreported or not matched by these troopers during the years they met the identification criteria.

Age Discrepancy:

The original audit allowed records to not match between the racial profiling and CIB databases by +/- two years. We matched 8,540 records with mismatched age data within the +/- two-year criteria. The reconciliation process determined that some records were not matched because the driver's age was outside the criteria established during the audit. A summary of the findings is outlined below, and a more detailed explanation of the age discrepancy can be found in Appendix A.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 63 out of 74
 - o 30 had fewer than ten age discrepancies
 - o 26 had between 10 and 50 age discrepancies
 - o 7 had more than 50 age discrepancies

- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 1,229 out of 4,148 (30 percent)
- On average, each reconciled Trooper had 17 unmatched records due to a +/- 10-year age discrepancy

Badge Data Errors:

Accurately reporting or recording the badge number on infraction records was a common problem identified in the audit. The audit attempted to deal with this issue by developing a procedure to try and match records between the CIB system and the racial profiling database with missing or inaccurate badge numbers. We matched 14,679 additional records with badge data errors in the audit. The reconciliation process determined that some records were not matched because the badge number was missing or misreported and not captured in the original audit. A summary of the findings is outlined below, and a more detailed explanation of the age discrepancy can be found in Appendix A.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 60 out of 74
 - o 30 had fewer than ten badge discrepancies
 - o 23 had between 10 and 50 badge discrepancies
 - o 7 had more than 50 badge discrepancies
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 1,427 out of 4,148 (32 percent)
- On average, each reconciled Trooper had 19 unmatched records due to badge errors.

Stop Date Errors:

The original audit allowed records to not match between the racial profiling and CIB databases by +/- two days. We matched 344 records with mismatched age data within the +/- two-day criteria. The reconciliation process determined that some records were not matched because the stop date was reported outside the criteria established during the audit. A summary of the findings is outlined below, and a more detailed explanation of the age discrepancy can be found in Appendix A.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 39 out of 74
 - o All but three Troopers had fewer than ten date discrepancies
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 149 out of 4,148 (4 percent)
- On average, each reconciled Trooper had four unmatched records due to date errors.

Town Tickets:

Connecticut General Statute 7-148 authorizes municipalities to, among other things, regulate traffic, the operation of vehicles on streets and highways, off-street parking and on-street residential neighborhood parking areas, the speed of vehicles, and other traffic-related issues. Most municipalities use their authority under CGS 7-148 to primarily regulate parking, and officers typically rely on state statutes to regulate other traffic-related offenses. In most cases, tickets issued for violating a municipal parking code are processed and adjudicated by the municipality, not the state. Town tickets rarely get issued for an offense that would require reporting under the racial profiling law. The reconciliation process determined that some records were submitted to the racial profiling database as traffic stops for local town violations, most likely parking violations. A summary of the findings is outlined below, and a more detailed explanation of the town ticket issue can be found in Appendix A.

• Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 12 out of 74

- Three had only one or two town tickets reported
- One had only eight town tickets for parking violations at Bradley International Airport.
- Five had between 10 and 50 town tickets
- o Two had between 50 and 100 town tickets
- o One had 428 town tickets
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 743 out of 4,148 (18 percent)

Voided Infractions:

In some cases, the trooper initially wrote an infraction ticket, but it was later voided. It is very rare for a ticket to be voided. When a ticket is voided, it usually occurs after the stop information has been reported to the racial profiling database.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 10 out of 74
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 20 out of 4,148 (0.5 percent)

Wrong Classification of Stop Outcome:

During the reconciliation process, CSP identified a small number of overreported records due to the trooper reporting the wrong stop outcome. For example, the stop resulted in a warning, but the trooper reported the stop outcome as an infraction.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 22 out of 74
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 65 out of 4,148 (1.6 percent)

Traffic Crash Classification:

CSP identified a small number of overreported records due to a trooper miscoding a traffic crash as a traffic stop.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 5 out of 74
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 24 out of 4,148 (0.6 percent)

Wrong Town Code:

CSP identified a small number of overreported records due to a trooper reporting the location to a local town, which received credit for the stops.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 2 out of 74
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 43 out of 4,148 (1 percent)

Commuter Lot Violation:

CSP identified a small number of overreported records submitted by one trooper for a violation of a commuter parking violation. Like many town tickets, a commuter parking violation would not be a traffic stop.

- Number of Reconciled Troopers Impacted: 1 out of 74
- Number of Reconciled Trooper Records Impacted: 16 out of 4,148 (1 percent)

UNRECONCILED TROOPER SUMMARY:

Of the 104 troopers reviewed, CSP could not reconcile 30 and only partially reconciled 7. In addition, one trooper only met the identification criteria in 2021, but CSP decided to reconcile 2017 through 2020 due to the size of the overreported records in those years. CSP could not reconcile the additional years, and this trooper was flagged during the reconciliation process. We consider the data for these 38 troopers to be unreconciled.

These 38 troopers collectively accounted for the most significant number of overreported records. Eight of the top ten troopers identified in the audit could not be reconciled, and 16 of the top 20 could not be reconciled. Below is a summary of the number of troopers that could not be reconciled.

- Number of Troopers Unreconciled: 38 out of 130 (29 percent)
 - o 6 had fewer than 50 overreported records
 - 13 had between 50 and 100 overreported records
 - o 12 had between 100 and 300 overreported records
 - o 6 had between 300 and 800 overreported records
 - o 1 Trooper had more than 1,300 overreported records
- These 38 troopers account for 8,400 out of 23,071 overreported records (36 percent)

In reviewing these troopers, CSP used a more stringent matching criterion than the original audit.¹² Following the review, CSP determined that some of these troopers had more overreported records for the years reviewed. Of the 8,400 overreported records, only 6,945 or 83 percent fell within years that met the identification criteria for additional review.

- Number of Records Identified as Unmatched after Review: 7,307 (increase of 362)
 - CSP identified more unmatched records for 20 of the 38 unreconciled troopers 13.

The reconciliation process generally confirms the initial findings in the original audit for these 38 troopers. Based on the results of the reconciliation review, the records submitted by these 38 troopers are unreliable. These records should continue to be considered unreliable unless additional investigations indicate otherwise.

CONSTABLE SUMMARY:

CSP reviewed overreported records for 63 constables identified by the audit. A different methodology was used to audit constable stop records, which was not as detailed as the audit for troopers. This meant we could not provide CSP with specific stops we believed were overreported by constables, as was done for the trooper reconciliation process. This process reconciled the records of 56 of the 63 constables, while another seven could not be reconciled within the identification criteria. Of the seven unreconciled constables, three are active as of the publishing of this report, and four are no longer working as constables.

Over half of the constables identified (34 of 63) in the audit worked under the Montville or Southbury Resident Trooper's office. All of these constables were reconciled to below the identification criteria.

¹² The audit attempted to make matches using very loose criteria and providing credit for records that may have had only a tenuous connection.

¹³ For some Troopers, CSP identified more unmatched records and identified in the audit. For example, the audit concluded that the trooper with the largest discrepancy had 1,350 unmatched records. The CSP review found 1,475 unmatched records between 2014 and 2017.

No constables in this group were found to have more than three unreconciled records in any given year. The audit flagged these constables as responsible for just over 3,000 overreported records of the 7,427 identified overreported records for constables. The reconciliation process matched all but 49 of the 3,000 overreported records for this cohort. The overwhelming majority of those reconciled records resulted from the constable badge number used by the officers, which differed from the NexGen call sign for those constables. The NexGen call sign was utilized in the audit to match CIB records. Many of these constables utilized a town-assigned constable badge number when completing the "Shield number" field on a paper infraction. CSP addressed this issue in October 2023 by requiring all constables to record their CSP-issued badge number on infraction records.

Aside from the constable badge number matter detailed above, the reconciliation process found the apparent reasons for other unmatched records in the original audit were similar to those found in the review of the 130 troopers. Those reasons include age differences, date differences, the issuance of town tickets, and badge transcription issues.

III. AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOW-UP

In June 2024, CSP updated the CT Racial Profiling Prohibition Project advisory board on the status of implementing its seven recommendations. In response to the recommendations, CSP reviewed its internal reporting systems, training, policies, and procedures related to collecting racial profiling data. Below is a summary of CSP's actions in response to our recommendations.

1. CSP should immediately reinforce to all current troopers and constables the consequences that exist under state law for those found to be submitting unsubstantiated or fictitious records intended to mislead either supervisors or the racial profiling data review system.

CSP Action: On June 23, 2023, CSP issued a training bulletin providing reinforcement and guidance related to definitions, accurate data entry, proper stop clearance, and frequently asked questions. Based on information reviewed during their internal review, CSP opened internal affairs investigations into six active Troopers and one Constable. In addition, CSP took administrative action or referred 25 other troopers for additional review.

CTRP3 Response: We recommend annual reminders through training or department bulletins about the importance of data integrity. In August 2024, the CTRP3 project staff began conducting bi-annual data training at the Police Academy. This training is available to all police agencies and will focus on new or updated reporting requirements for racial profiling data and other state-mandated reporting programs. In addition, the project staff are also developing a data manual, which will outline data collection requirements and answer frequently asked questions. This manual will be updated annually and distributed to all police agencies.

2. Timely supervisory review of records submitted by troopers is the key to assuring the continuing accuracy of traffic stop records. The expectations for troop commanders and supervisory staff must be reviewed regarding the importance of record accuracy for all those under their supervision. Supervisors must ensure that all personnel meet agency standards for the accurate reporting of information.

CSP Action: CSP command staff and supervisors utilize the internal records management system to screen their respective units' data on a regular basis. This includes a monthly review of reported data and body-worn camera and in-car camera footage of traffic stops. Supervisors can now review the racial profiling demographics for a particular call for service, including a review of how the stop was cleared. The Office of Administrative Services compares Centralized Infraction Bureau data monthly to identify errors.

CTRP3 Response: The internal review process developed by CSP appears to be strong. The project staff is exploring its strengths to determine whether a similar oversight model should be implemented in other agencies. The project staff is also exploring the development of an automated early warning system to help reduce the manual review of records by police administrators.

3. An independent record of all traffic stops communicated to dispatch should be retained in the dispatch log.

CSP Action: After careful consideration, CSP did not implement this recommendation. CSP operates 12 dispatch centers across the state, each effectively supporting a mid-sized police department. CSP

believes that this recommendation would increase the burden on dispatchers responding to 911 calls, routine calls, radio calls, and other interactions. CSP believes that the new oversight protocols are sufficient measures, and this recommendation would provide a less-than-marginal return.

CTRP3 Response: Although we believe it is best practice to have a dispatcher retain a separate log of each case, we understand the unique nature of operating a state police agency compared to a municipal agency, where this may be more common. Based on the additional actions already taken by CSP, we agree with their current assessment that implementing this recommendation is not necessary at this time.

4. The CSP command staff should reevaluate how case numbers are issued.

CSP Action: Again, after careful consideration, CSP determined that this change would increase the burden on dispatchers, does not guarantee added accuracy, and may diminish public and officer safety due to a potentially extended amount of time taken at the side of the road. In addition, the CSP Administrative and Operations Manual, Section 9.1.4 Reporting Traffic Stops, currently mandates that traffic stops "shall" be called into the dispatch center to report the stop, location, direction, duty status, the ID of Trooper, registration of the vehicle and reason for the stop. On February 23, 2024, CSP issued a training bulletin outlining changes to codes used in the CAD system. This change ensures that the dispatch center monitors each Trooper logged into CAD.

CTRP3 Response: As we have seen in many municipal police departments, we believe it is best practice to have dispatchers issue a case number after stop information has been called into dispatch. Dispatchers controlling the issuance of a case number can be an added layer of assurance that the stop activity is part of an actual event. Unfortunately, there is evidence that at least a small number of troopers were creating traffic stop cases by issuing trooper-initiated stop numbers within the records management system for events that were inaccurate. That being said, we believe that the additional actions already taken by CSP to ensure that supervisors are more closely monitoring traffic stop activity and conducting routine internal audits are sufficient to address our concerns. We agree with the CSP assessment that implementing this recommendation is not necessary at this time.

5. Whenever troopers or constables enter a traffic stop into the system that results in an infraction, the infraction ticket number should also be part of the data entered in the NexGen records management system.

CSP Action: CSP fully implemented this recommendation in October 2023. In addition, CSP worked to equip all patrol cars with e-citation equipment, which will reduce the use of paper infractions.

CTRP3 Response: The CSP created a model for integrating the ticket number into the record management system that is now being replicated for all agencies. In 2025, providing the ticket number for all stops that result in an infraction will be mandatory for all police agencies.

6. Provide clear guidance and training to troopers regarding the proper reporting of stops made involving a commercial vehicle.

CSP Action: On August 1, 2023, CSP provided a document advising troopers of new and revised call types and sub-types to better manage commercial vehicle activity. The system changes were designed to alleviate confusion regarding commercial vehicle stops requiring racial profiling data reporting.

CTRP3 Response: This change alleviated our concerns, and CTRP3 staff will provide similar guidance to other agencies that make commercial vehicle stops.

7. The advisory board should consider having CTRP3 staff conduct an annual audit of CSP data for at least the next three calendar years.

CSP Action: This recommendation was directed to the advisory board. CSP agrees with the recommendation and to participate in future data audits.

CTRP3 Response: The advisory board is developing more comprehensive audit protocols. This may include criteria for determining when an audit should be conducted and a process for reviewing the findings. A protocol for determining future audits will include all agencies in Connecticut, not just the state police.

In addition to addressing the seven specific recommendations outlined in the original audit report, CSP has addressed several other concerns raised during the reconciliation process. Below is a summary of additional steps taken by CSP to address data collection and reporting concerns:

- 1. In October 2023, CSP issued a training bulletin addressing the procedure, circumstances, and documentation retention related to voiding an infraction or misdemeanor summons. During the reconciliation process, it was determined that a small number of records were not matched because the infraction was voided before it was sent to the Centralized Infractions Bureau. The racial profiling record shows an infraction was issued, but no match could be made since the record was not provided to CIB. The clarification provided in the bulletin should alleviate this problem in the future.
- 2. CSP issued Special Order #23-01 in October 2023, which reinforced the following:
 - a. proper use of municipal ("town") tickets
 - b. required use of e-citation technology whenever feasible to reduce the opportunity for discrepancies
 - c. required constables to use the DESPP-assigned ID number on all paper infractions.

These additional changes address many of the most significant issues identified in the reconciliation process. CSP informed us they are reviewing several other actions, procedures, and safeguards to improve data collection efforts and have committed to continuing to work collaboratively with the CTRP3 project staff and advisory board. CSP has made significant progress in addressing the most critical concerns outlined in the June 2023 audit. We are confident that the changes made or in development have improved the accuracy of data reported by CSP. CSP's oversight mechanisms will help improve the public's trust in the data reporting system. We remain committed to working with all police partners to fulfill State Senator Alvin W. Penn's mission and vision.

APPENDIX A

Below is additional information on the primary errors in the records that were identified during the reconciliation process.

Age Discrepancy: in the original audit, researchers could easily match electronic tickets with the racial profiling record. For these matched records, researchers identified the standard error rate for reported fields such as date, age, location, violation code, and others. We used this standard error rate to determine a reasonable human error rate for the non-electronic citation records that needed to be matched. The audit ran twelve different scenarios accounting for the most common record errors to attempt to match records. It was determined that the age of the driver reported to the racial profiling system did not match the age reported on a ticket by less than one year on average. We doubled the standard error rate and allowed the records not to match by +/- two years. If the age in either the racial profiling database or the CIB database was not provided, then the match on age was not required. The original audit made a match for 8,540 additional records where the driver's age did not match +/- 2 years between the databases.

The infraction record requires officers to provide the date of birth of the person who received the ticket. The racial profiling database requires that officers report the driver's age. Although the records management system will convert the date of birth to an accurate age when issuing an electronic ticket, this does not occur for non-electronic tickets. Some troopers likely misreported a driver's age when manually converting the date of birth to an age. Although the exact reasons why the age may have been misreported were outside the scope of this review, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the errors are natural human errors.

Badge Data Errors: Accurately reporting or recording the badge number on infraction records was a common problem identified in the audit. The audit attempted to deal with this issue by developing a procedure to try and match records between the CIB system and the racial profiling database. In particular, the audit matched any trooper identification number listed on a given ticket book (consisting of ten tickets), which allowed for possible transcription errors on any given ticket. The general idea was that the likelihood of the badge number being misreported on all tickets in a ticket book would be low. If even one ticket in a book had the correct badge number, the trooper could be matched to any of the remaining nine tickets. The original audit made a match of 14,679 additional records with badge data errors. This issue can largely be avoided by increasing the use of electronic tickets issued by troopers, which will automatically provide the badge number.

Date Discrepancy: Part of the original audit methodology allowed the date to vary when matching records between the infraction and racial profiling databases. Again, we used the standard error rate to determine a reasonable human error rate for the non-electronic citation records that needed to be matched. The audit ran twelve different scenarios accounting for the most common record errors to attempt to match records. It was determined that the stop date in the racial profiling system did not match the date reported on a ticket by less than one day on average. We doubled the standard error rate and allowed the records not to match by +/- two days. The original audit made a match for 344 additional records where the stop date did not match +/- 2 days between the databases.

Town Ticket: When police in Connecticut engage in routine traffic enforcement, they typically enforce state statutes. If the officer determines that an infraction is warranted, a citation is written for violating that statute. Those infractions are then sent to the Centralized Infractions Bureau for

processing and adjudication. Connecticut General Statute 7-148 authorizes municipalities to, among other things, regulate traffic, the operation of vehicles on streets and highways, off-street parking and on-street residential neighborhood parking areas, the speed of vehicles, and other traffic-related issues. Most municipalities use their authority under CGS 7-148 to primarily regulate parking, and officers typically rely on state statutes to regulate other traffic-related offenses. In most cases, tickets issued for violating a municipal parking code are processed and adjudicated by the municipality, not the state. Town tickets rarely get issued for an offense that would require reporting under the racial profiling law.

In our discussions with CSP, the issue was raised that some troopers may have been confused about completing racial profiling data when they issue a ticket for a parking violation and the car's operator is present. CSP asked for clarification about whether this scenario would constitute a traffic stop and should be reported to the racial profiling database. In this scenario, it was raised that since the operator is being detained briefly while the ticket is issued, this could constitute a traffic stop. This question was not previously presented to the advisory board for consideration by any police agency in Connecticut. CSP did not provide any specific examples of parking tickets reported to the racial profiling database where the operator was present, although it is plausible that this could happen occasionally. However, we believe that this scenario is rare.

CSP confirmed that a town ticket was reported as a violation within their records management system and made efforts to obtain copies of the town tickets. Since towns are responsible for adjudicating town violations, and several years have lapsed, retaining copies of these tickets to examine the nature of the violations more closely was challenging.

Traffic stops entered into the racial profiling database require the demographics of the drivers to be entered. The system does not allow the Trooper to advance until all the required demographic information has been provided. If a Trooper enters a town ticket into the racial profiling database for a parking violation, and the vehicle's operator is not present, they cannot complete the driver's demographic information accurately. In most instances, it could not be determined if the vehicle's operator was present during a local parking violation issuance, and these stop records should be considered unreliable.

CTRP3 project staff wanted to explore these records in more detail due to the complex relationship between town tickets and other violations. It appears that for many of these troopers, town tickets were issued for parking violations. The troopers reconciled had submitted town tickets in Mansfield, New Hartford, Chester, Stafford, and Windsor Locks. The most significant case involved a trooper with 487 overreported records from 2014 to 2021, of which 428 were town tickets, primarily parking violations in Mansfield. Many of these tickets were issued within a short time and distance of each other, further indicating that they were likely for parking rather than traffic stops. In most instances, the CSP could not confirm whether the vehicle driver was present during the issuance of these tickets, raising concerns about the accuracy of demographic data. This misreporting undermines the integrity of the records in the racial profiling system.

Other Issues: The reconciliation process identified a smaller number of other issues that explain unaccounted records in the database. A summary of these issues is outlined below.

Voided Infraction: In some cases, the trooper may initially write an infraction ticket, but it will later be voided. It is very rare for a ticket to be voided. When a ticket is voided, it usually occurs after the stop information has been reported to the racial profiling database and was not corrected.

Wrong Classification of a Stop Outcome: In the audit, we reviewed racial profiling records where the stop was reported as resulting in a ticket. If the stop outcome indicated an infraction, we looked to find the matching infraction in the CIB database. During the reconciliation process, CSP identified a small number of overreported records due to the trooper reporting the wrong stop outcome. For example, the stop resulted in a warning, but the trooper reported the stop outcome as an infraction.

Traffic Crash: When troopers respond to a call, it is coded within their internal records management system. Although infractions are primarily issued for traffic violations during a traffic stop, they can be issued during non-traffic stop-related activities, such as a crash investigation. CSP identified a small number of overreported records due to a trooper miscoding a traffic crash as a traffic stop.

Wrong Town Code: CSP provides local policing services through the resident trooper program or the local troop barracks in many small towns in Connecticut. In recent years, some towns have transitioned their resident trooper program into an independent municipal police department. East Lyme is one of the jurisdictions that transitioned into an independent municipal police department. It was determined that at least 43 unmatched records were coded to the local East Lyme Police Department.

Commuter Lot Violation: One trooper had 16 infraction records written for a 13B-29 statutory violation. This statute is a violation of regulations in a commuter parking facility. It is commonly used to ticket vehicles during a weather event, such as a snowstorm, when the vehicles are not moved promptly. This trooper issued 16 commuter parking violations and coded them as traffic stops in the racial profiling database. Like many town tickets, a commuter parking violation would not be a traffic stop. In addition, it is unlikely that these vehicles were occupied, and therefore, the trooper would have no demographic information to complete the stop form accurately.